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PENNHURST AS A SOURCE OF DEFENSES
FOR STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
George D. Brown*
Tucked away toward the end of the Supreme Court's opinion in Pen-
nhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman' is a road map to possible
state and local defenses to suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 and fed-
eral grant suits in general. Pennhurst involved a challenge to conditions at
a state facility for the mentally retarded. The Court held that the "bill of
rights" section of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act of 19753 did not impose obligations upon states receiving fed-
eral funds under the Act.4 The plaintiffs also had potential claims under
two sections of the Act which required participating states to make "assur-
ances" to the Secretary of Health and Human Services concerning the
treatment furnished to individuals.' While these claims were not before
the Court, Justice Rehnquist, joined by four other Justices, discussed four
possible obstacles to bringing suit under these provisions. All four may
prove to be important state and local defenses if later enshrined in
holdings.
Justice Rehnquist indicated that the assurance claim could be brought
under section 1983. He first noted that section 1983 protects "rights se-
cured" by federal law and questioned whether "assurances" to the Secre-
tary could be treated as rights belonging to the plaintiffs.6 Second, he
noted that section 1983 would not apply if the remedy which the Act con-
tained were viewed as exclusive.7 Third, Justice Rehnquist suggested that
the remedies available to a section 1983 plaintiff challenging the conduct of
a federal grantee might be limited to a declaration of noncompliance and
* A.B., Harvard University, 1961; LL.B., Harvard University, 1965; Professor of Law,
Boston College Law School.
1. 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
3. Id §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
4. 101 S. Ct. at 1540.
5. The plaintiffs claimed that 42 U.S.C. § 6011 (Supp. III 1979) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 6063(b)(5)(C) (Supp. III 1979) granted them the right to bring suit. 101 S. Ct. at 1545.
6. 101 S. Ct. at 1545.
7. Id
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an injunction requiring either compliance or foregoing federal funds.' Fi-
nally, he touched on the merits, noting that the particular facility might not
be subject to the Act's conditions since it did not receive federal funds.9
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, disassociated himself
from these statements. He suggested that the plaintiffs, "the intended ben-
eficiaries of the Act," could sue under either an implied right theory or
under section 1983.10 He also felt that the facility was covered by the Act
since it was part of the state's overall program, which did receive funds."
Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, also dis-
agreed with the majority as to the availability of relief under section 1983.
Justice White's discussion of the issue dealt only with the "exclusive rem-
edy" exception, finding it inapplicable. ' 2 As discussed below, he did agree
as to the remedies available in such a suit. It must be emphasized that the
majority's discussion of the "assurances" claim is dictum. (Justice Black-
mun labeled it "advisory"). Nonetheless, it is significant that five Justices
reached out to suggest these limits. In large part, the dictum reflects the
concern of some Justices that the Court may have gone too far in Maine v.
Thiboutot.13 Two of the four limits are aimed directly at Thiboutot. The
reasons for the Justices' concern and the impact of the new limits require
an understanding of that case.
I. THziioUTOT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Federal courts are not common law courts of general jurisdiction.
Therefore, in order to bring a federal claim, it is not enough that the plain-
tiff assert a violation of federal substantive law. A plaintiff must also con-
vince the court that federal law authorizes a suit to redress that violation.
In some instances, Congress provides expressly for suits. In other cases,
courts "imply" a right of action as a matter of statutory interpretation.
When state and local governments or their officials are defendants, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 may provide the cause of action. This section declares that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured
8. Id at 1545-46.
9. Id
10. Id at 1547 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
11. Id at 1548.
12. Id at 1549 (White, J., dissenting).
13. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress .... 14
For many years, lawyers were uncertain whether section 1983 provided
a right of action for violation of all federal statutes, or whether it was lim-
ited to "laws" within the area generally referred to as civil, or equal rights.
In Maine v. Thiboutot,15 the Supreme Court appeared to adopt the broad
view, subjecting state and local defendants to section 1983 suits for viola-
tion of any federal statute.
The case involved a challenge by welfare recipients to a reduction in
their payments, which they asserted violated federal law. The action was
brought in state court and resulted in a ruling favorable to plaintiffs. On
writ of certiorari, the state sought review of a ruling by its Supreme Judi-
cial Court that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees under section 1988,
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.16 According to the
Supreme Court, the case presented two issues: "(1) whether § 1983 encom-
passes claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law, and (2) if
so, whether attorney's fees under § 1988 may be awarded to the prevailing
party in such an action. 7 In a somewhat cursory opinion, Justice Bren-
nan, writing for a majority of six, answered both questions in the affirma-
tive. In resolving the coverage issue, he emphasized the "plain language"
of section 1983, i.e., its reference to "laws" in addition to the Constitu-
tion.' He also relied on numerous cases, such as Edelman v. Jordan,'9
which appeared to rest on the premise that section 1983 extended to statu-
tory claims. Finally, he analyzed the legislative history as inconclusive,
arguing that when Congress added the words, "and laws," to the predeces-
sor of section 1983, it might have envisaged only equal rights laws, or it
might have had a broader purpose.2z
Having decided that the original challenge was a section 1983 action,
Justice Brennan invoked the plain language of section 1983 to affirm the
holding that an award of attorney's fees was proper. "Since we hold that
this statutory action is properly brought under § 1983, and since § 1988
makes no exception for statutory § 1983 actions, § 1988 plainly applies to
this suit."'"
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
15. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
17. 448 U.S. at 3.
18. Id. at 5-6.
19. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
20. 448 U.S. at 6-7.
21. Id at9.
19821
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In a sharp dissent, Justice Powell chastised the majority for deciding the
matter "almost casually, 22 and took issue with it on both legislative history
and on the weight of prior decisions. Of particular concern to Justice Pow-
ell were the serious policy and programmatic arguments against extending
section 1983 to all statutory claims. He noted that states and localities are
engaged in "literally hundreds ' 23 of cooperative programs with the federal
government. He emphasized that with the broad scope of grant programs,
there would be a vast increase in third-party grant litigation.24
Part of Justice Powell's objection to this impact of Thiboutot rested on
federalism grounds: the spectre of the federal courts overseeing a broad
range of state and local activities. He was also disturbed by the potential
for a vast increase in damage claims against governmental grantees and
their officials for violations of grant conditions. In the case of municipali-
ties, he noted that the combined effect of Thiboutot and Owen v. City of
Independence25 could be strict liability for such violations2 6
Thiboutot created consternation among state and local officials. One can
identify at least three negative consequences likely to flow from the
decision.
A. Increased Volume of Suits
From the plaintifi's perspective, one of the great advantages of Thiboutot
is that there is no longer any right of action problem. Section 1983 pro-
vides an express right of action. This is particularly helpful to plaintiffs
since the Supreme Court has begun to take an increasingly restrictive ap-
proach to implying rights of action.27 Litigants have already begun to in-
voke Thiboutot in attempting to utilize section 1983 in cases involving
federal grant statutes 28 and regulatory programs. 29 Grant litigation is a
potentially fertile area, given the large number of interests created by grant
statutes and "cross-cutting" mandates which further national policies such
as nondiscrimination.
22. Id at 11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
23. Id at 22.
24. Id at 23-24.
25. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
26. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 22 n.10.
27. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
28. See, e.g., Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1981).
29. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 501 F.
Supp. 821 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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B. Increased Availability of Attorney's Fees
As indicated, the actual holding of Thiboutot was that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a recovery of attorney's fees. The relevant statute is the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, which provides in part as fol-
lows: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title. . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
CoStS."
30
Since any federal statutory suit is, under Thiboutot, a section 1983 suit,
attorney's fees are potentially available. This development comes just as
what might be called "attorney's fees law" is a burgeoning new field, with
developments largely favoring plantiffs and their attorneys. A recent re-
port by the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law concluded
that
disputes over the amount of a fee are becoming increasingly com-
plex, defense arguments more novel and innovative, and the fee
computation portion of a case extremely time consuming. The
end result, has, however, despite these difficulties been useful:
the courts, whether willingly or not, are beginning to view public
interest litigation as worthy and important litigation, and the fees
awarded attorneys who undertake such cases are becoming
larger.31
This development may, of course, lead to an increase in the number of
suits brought, since independently-financed advocacy groups will have lit-
erally nothing to lose. In addition, from the defendant's point of view, the
size of the fees themselves may become a problem. Litigation under fed-
eral statutes, such as grant programs, is frequently complex and time-con-
suming; multistaged proceedings, including appeals, remands, and
rehearings, are frequent. Though probably not "ruinous," these outlays
could constitute a serious drain on some defendants' treasuries.
C Damages
A third possible consequence of Thiboutot could be greater availability
of damages. Under traditional implication doctrine, a court might be will-
ing to imply a cause of action but, at the same time, find that a damage
remedy was inappropriate. Since Thiboutot tells us that section 1983
means what it says, and since the statute provides in part that any defend-
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
31. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, COMMITTEE REPORT No.
39 at 4 (Oct. 1980).
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ant subject to it "shall be liable to the party injured," courts might feel that
they have no choice but to rule that damages are an appropriate remedy.
The interaction between Thiboutot and Owen v. City of Independence32 be-
comes important at this point. Owen appears to establish strict municipal
liability for violation of federal statutes as well as for violation of the Con-
stitution. Justice Powell relied heavily on this point in his dissent in
Thiboutot.3 It should be noted, however, that the courts may still require
the plaintiff to show tangible harm, as well as a federal law violation,
before awarding actual damages.34 While perhaps the most speculative of
the possible consequences, the damages potential of Thiboutot should not
be minimized.
In sum, state and local officials had every reason to be concerned about
the decision. They have called for it to be overturned. A Senate bill to do
this is progressing through the Judiciary Committee.35 However, there are
significant indications that the Court itself is having second thoughts about
the broad sweep of Thiboutot and is in the process of creating narrowing
principles. It is important for state and local lawyers to be aware of these
developments and of promising new defenses to section 1983 statutory
claims.36 Furthermore, these developments extend beyond section 1983 to
federal grant litigation generally.
II. LIMITATIONS ON Thiboutot
A. Congressional Foreclosure of Private Enforcement
Under the first Pennhurst exception, a court may treat the existence of
alternative remedies in the statute which plaintiffs invoke as evidence of
preclusion of a private right under section 1983. 3 ' This defense is particu-
larly promising because the Court has already elevated it from the
Pennhurst dictum to a holding. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Association ,38 the plaintiffs claimed injury to fish-
ing grounds by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other waste.
A principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether a right to bring
the suit could be implied under either the Federal Water Pollution Control
32. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
33. 448 U.S. at 22 n. 11.
34. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978).
35. S. 584, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
36. Plaintiffs' lawyers can be expected to rely heavily on Thiboutot and to continue
urging that it be interpreted broadly.
37. 101 S. Ct. at 1545.
38. 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
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Act (FWPCA),39 or the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972 (MPRSA) °.4  Both statutes contain elaborate enforcement mecha-
nisms, including provisions for citizen suits. These provisions, however,
do not authorize damages, which the plaintiffs sought, and they require
notice to various parties, which plaintiffs had not given.
In addressing the implied right of action issue, Justice Powell utilized
the Court's most recent approach--emphasizing the language of a statute
and legislative history-in order to ascertain the intent of Congress. 4 He
emphasized the "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions" 42 as evi-
dence of congressional intent to bar any additional private judicial en-
forcement. The legislative history also supported this conclusion,43 but it
seems clear that the structure of the Act was the principal rationale.
Although the plaintiffs had invoked "a wide variety of legal theories"'
to support their suit, they had not thought to raise section 1983. However,
Justice Powell did it for them. He emphasized that Thiboutot was a recent
decision and that its construction of section 1983 could have a significant
bearing on the case.4' Nonetheless, his opinion suggests that, like Justice
Rehnquist in Pennhurst, he was eager to seize an opportunity to drive
home the point that Thiboutot is not as broad as it seems.
He cited Pennhurst as recognizing "two exceptions to the application of
§ 1983 to statutory violations., 46 These exceptions apply if Congress has
"foreclosed private enforcement of [the] statute in the enactment itself,"47
or if the statute which plaintiff invokes does not create "enforceable 'rights'
under § 1983. "48
Justice Powell found the first exception applicable. His analysis is essen-
tially a repetition of his reasoning for refusing to imply a right of action:
that the comprehensiveness of the remedies provided in the FWPCA and
the MPRSA demonstrated legislative intent to foreclose relief under sec-
tion 1983.
39. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp.III 1979).
40. Id §§ 1401-1444.
41. 101 S. Ct. at 2622-23. See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 15 (1979). The use of this approach omits the third and fourth "factors" listed by
the Court in its implied right analysis in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), namely, whether an
implied right is consistent with the purposes of the statute and whether the suit basically
involves state law matters. Id at 78.
42. 101 S. Ct. at 2623.
43. Id. at 2625.
44. Id at 2619.
45. Id at 2626.
46. Id
47. Id.
48. Id
19821
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented as to the availa-
bility of a right of action under section 1983 .'9 He expressed general
agreement with the first exception relied upon by the Court-that a com-
prehensive remedial scheme can evidence a congressional decision to pre-
clude other remedies-but stressed that the inquiry should focus on
whether Congress intended to withdraw the section 1983 right of action,
not on whether it intended to preserve it.50 He relied heavily on the fact
that both the FWPCA and the MPRSA contained "savings clauses" which
preserved rights which litigants might have under other statutes as negat-
ing any such intent.
The net effect of Pennhurst and National Sea Clammers may be to
"merge" section 1983 analysis with implied right of action analysis. There-
fore, cases involving the latter issue will be utilized in exploring this de-
fense. The defendant's case is strongest when the underlying statute
provides comprehensive remedies, including some judicial remedy for the
plaintiff. This was the situation in National Sea Clammers. Whenever a
federal statute contains a "citizens suit" provision, that should rule out any
additional relief against state and local defendants. For example, in Mey-
erson v. Arizona, 1 the court found that such a provision in the General
Revenue Sharing statute, although providing 'very limited' relief, pre-
cluded a section 1983 action.52  Many federal statutes, however, do not
contain any reference to private enforcement. The question for state and
local defendants, in cases arising under such statutes, is how comprehen-
sive the remedial scheme must be to bring the statute within the first
Pennhurst exception. Defendants may be able to get some mileage out of
the 5-to-4 Supreme Court decision in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis.53 In that case, the majority refused to imply a private right
of action for damages under the Investment Advisers Act.5 4 The opinion
noted that "Congress expressly provided both judicial and administrative
means for enforcing compliance. . . ." These include empowering the
Securities & Exchange Commission to impose administrative sanctions
and to bring civil compliance actions in federal courts. Violations of the
Act are also criminal offenses. Thus, the Court found it highly improbable
that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private ac-
49. Id at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 2631.
51. 507 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1981).
52. Id at 863.
53. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976).
55. 444 U.S. at 20.
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tion." 56 Transamerica may stand for the proposition that a wide range of
governmental enforcement mechanisms shows that Congress intended to
preclude private enforcement, either under an implied right theory or by
extension of section 1983." 7
The hardest case for defendants seeking to invoke the first Pennhurst
exception arises when the only statutory remedies are fiscal sanctions such
as suspension or termination of federal grant funds. This is the typical
pattern in grant statutes. Indeed, it was the case in Pennhurst itself. There-
fore, there may be considerable significance to the fact that, even in that
context, Justice Rehnquist raised the possibility that "the express remedy
contained in [the] Act is exclusive.""8
Nonetheless, state and local defendants urging such a position upon a
court will have to cope with the long line of Supreme Court "welfare
cases" beginning with King v. Smith.59 The major obstacle would be Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion in Rosado v. Wyman .6' The specific issue in that case
was not whether welfare plaintiffs had a right of action under the Social
Security Act but whether they must first exhaust administrative remedies.
A majority of the Court refused to order exhaustion, in part on the ground
that the plaintiffs could not participate in the administrative proceeding.
Justice Harlan stated:
We have considered and rejected the argument that a federal
court is without power to review state welfare provisions or pro-
hibit the use of federal funds by the States in view of the fact that
Congress has lodged in the Department of HEW the power to cut
off federal funds for noncompliance with statutory requirements.
We are most reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue
of effective judicial review to those individuals most directly af-
fected by the administration of its program.6'
Perhaps this reluctance can be overcome by a showing that the adminis-
trative procedures do allow participation. Otherwise, despite Justice
Rehnquist's suggestion, it is doubtful that a court would find them
"exclusive."62
56. Id (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
57. This interpretation may be weakened slightly by the fact that the majority implied a
limited private remedy, the right to void contracts with noncomplying advisers and to the
refund of any fees paid. 444 U.S. at 19.
58. 101 S.Ct. at 1545.
59. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
60. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
61. Id at 420.
62. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 706 n.41.
1982]
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B. Focusing on the Existence of Rights
Alternatively, using the second Pennhurst exception, state and local de-
fendants may be able to argue that the federal statute the plaintiff invokes
does not confer any rights upon him, as required by the express language
of section 1983. Again, cases on implied rights of action may be relevant
precedents. The first of the Cort v. Ash63 factors involves the following
question: "[I]s the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted'-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor
of the plaintiff?" 6
4
The question is how the court analyzes the plaintiff's relationship to the
statute. A good example is the 1980 decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 65 In this case,
handicapped plaintiffs asserted that they had been the victims of handicap-
based discrimination in their employment by federal contractors. The
plaintiffs asserted that this conduct violated section 503 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973.66 That statute requires that every federal contract over
$2,500 contain "a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry
out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handi-
capped individuals ... "67 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit upheld
the district court's dismissal of the case on the ground that no private cause
of action could be implied under section 503.68
The court analyzed section 503 as clearly conferring benefits upon hand-
icapped persons. However, it concluded that the benefits did not rise to
the level of rights, including the ability to sue to enforce those rights. The
opinion contrasted this section with section 504 of the same Act, which
states that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . "...69
The majority relied heavily on the Supreme Court's statement in Cannon
v. University of Chicago 71 that the "right-or duty-creating language of the
statute has generally been the most accurate indication of the propriety of
63. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
64. Id at 78 (quoting in part Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
65. 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979),
67. Id § 793(a) (Supp.III 1979).
68. 611 F.2d at 1078.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 974 (Supp. III 1979).
70. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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implication of a cause of action."' In Cannon, Justice Stevens contrasted
a provision stating that no person shall be discriminated against on the
basis of sex in any grant program with a provision that forbade discrimina-
tion by any federal grantee on the basis of sex.7 2 In terms of commands to
the grantee, the two statutes are identical. Justice Stevens stated, however,
that there would be much less reason to imply a cause of action under the
latter formulation.73 The difference in wording may reflect the accidents
of draftsmanship rather than a conscious policy decision about creating
judicially-enforceable "rights." Nonetheless, section 1983 defendants
should make the most of it.
In the regulatory context, state and local defendants may be successful
in arguing that whatever duties they are under are not for the particular
benefit of the plaintiff. In California v. Sierra Club," plaintiffs attacked a
large water project as violative of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899 which prohibits "[t]he creation of any obstruc-
tion not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of
any of the waters of the United States . . . ."" The Supreme Court re-
versed lower court holdings that plaintiffs had an implied right of action to
enforce the Act. Relying in part on Justice Steven's distinction in Cannon,
the Court concluded that the Act was designed "to benefit the public at
large" by clarifying Congress' power in the area.76
In the case of suits based on federal grant statutes, the analysis becomes
somewhat more complex. This is due to the nature of the grant device
itself. Funds go to a governmental body (which is thus aided), but the
ultimate beneficiaries are individuals. The question for the courts will be
at what point these benefits become rights. Answers may not be too diffi-
cult in the case of categorical grants, which create specific entitlements,
and cross-cutting strings such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 77
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national ori-
gin in federally-assisted programs. However, as one moves into block
grants, the picture is less clear. A good example is the statutory preference
71. Id at 690 n.13.
72. Id at 693 n.14.
73. Id at 690-93.
74. 101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
76. 101 S. Ct. at 1779. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1978)
(requirement that national securities exchange members and registered broker-dealers keep
certain records does not create a federal right in favor of private parties).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976).
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of the Community Development Block Grant program 78 for activities ben-
efiting low and moderate income people. Is a preference a right, or is the
Rogers analysis applicable?
79
After Pennhurst, it seems reasonably clear that state and local litigants
can argue that preferences, bills of rights, and congressional findings in
grant statutes do not create rights for section 1983 purposes. Of potentially
great significance is Justice Rehnquist's questioning whether grantee assur-
ances (to the grantor) of certain types of conduct confer upon third parties
any rights to such conduct.8 ° State and local litigants should pursue this
argument vigorously, since such assurances are one of the standard fea-
tures of the grant system.'
III. OTHER DEFENSES TO FEDERAL GRANT SUITS
The implications of Justice Rehnquist's statements in Pennhurst extend
beyond section 1983 to grant litigation generally. The two remaining de-
fenses suggested by his opinion are considered in this section.
A. Limiting the Remedy
Apart from blocking suits altogether, the retreat from Thiboutot may
limit the plaintiff's remedial options in a significant class of cases: third-
party grant litigation. As indicated above, this is the area in which
7hiboutot's construction of section 1983 is likely to generate most new liti-
gation. Third-party challenges to the award or administration of grants
were a major growth area of grant litigation even before Thiboutot. In
many instances, plaintiffs have sought relief which resembles specific per-
formance, seeking an order that the grantee alter its conduct to benefit
them.
A good example is Camenisch v. University of Texas.82 A deaf student
challenged the university's failure to provide him with a sign language in-
terpreter as a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197383
and HEW's implementing regulations.84 The district court ordered the
university to provide an interpreter, pending a decision on the merits, but
78. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5319 (1976
& Supp. III 1979).
79. 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
80. 101 S. Ct. at 1545.
81. But see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (allowing private enforcement of
assurances).
82. 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1981).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979).
84. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d) (1981).
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conditioned this preliminary relief on plaintiffs filing a complaint with
HEW. s5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the
granting of preliminary relief, but ruled that it was error to require exhaus-
tion of any administrative remedies.8 6 It drew a sharp distinction between
judicial and administrative resolution of such complaints, noting that the
latter could only result in funds termination-a remedy which would
hardly benefit the plaintiff. 7 The court relied heavily on Justice Stevens'
opinion in Cannon. In other instances, courts have gone so far as to award
damages to third parties asserting incorrect administration of grant
programs.8s
Pennhurst was a third-party grant case. Justice Rehnquist's statements
cast considerable doubt on the availability of broad relief in such cases,
whether brought under section 1983 or under an implied right theory. In
dealing with the remedial question, he first stated that '[r]espondents' relief
may well be limited to enjoining the Federal Government from providing
funds to the Commonwealth."8 9
Taken literally, this statement means that no section 1983 suit could have
been brought at all, since that statute only authorizes such suits against
state and local officials. Justice Rehnquist may have meant that even if a
section 1983 suit can be brought against the nonfederal defendants, the
only remedy available would be analogous to that in a suit against the
grantor agency: a declaration that the grantee is violating a federal norm
and an injunction requiring it to cease violation or relinquish federal
funds. His citation of Justice Harlan's opinion in Rosado v. Wyman 90 but-
tresses this interpretation. Justice Harlan stated in Rosado that "the unar-
ticulated premise" in any third-party challenge is that the grantee has the
choice of complying or foregoing the federal funds.9' The three Justices
who dissented on the merits in Pennhurst agreed with Justice Rehnquist on
the remedial point.92 In particular, Justice White singled out as inappro-
priate the appointment of a special master with broad powers over resident
placement.93
85. 616 F.2d at 129-30.
86. Id. at 134.
87. ld at 135.
88. See Cappalli, Federal Grants and the New Statutory Tort: State and Local Officials
Beware/ 12 URB. LAw. 445 (1980).
89. 101 S. Ct. at 1545.
90. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
91. Id at 420-21.
92. 101 S. Ct. at 1556.
93. Id at 1558.
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The reaffirmation of the Rosado principle may be an important develop-
ment in grant litigation. The Court, and numerous lower courts, have
often appeared to abandon it, sanctioning specific relief in grant cases and
even invoking the supremacy clause.9 4 It is also noteworthy that the prin-
ciple was revived in a section 1983 case, since that statute is exceptionally
broad in terms of the remedies it authorizes. The practical effect of the
remedial statements in Pennhurst is less certain. Certainly, state and local
defendants will now advance the argument that damages are simply un-
available in grant suits. (In addition, states can also invoke the eleventh
amendment.) They should also be able to argue that "systemic" reme-
dies-such as the appointment of masters or court monitoring of compli-
ance-are inappropriate in grant cases. The effect of the unavailability of
specific relief is not clear. As a practical matter, an either-or decree may
have the same effect. Many third-party complaints are already couched in
such terms. At the very least, however, the grantee's "free choice" alterna-
tive of opting out of a grant program may increase its leverage in a particu-
lar lawsuit, since a court is likely to be extremely reluctant actually to
order termination of funds.
B. When Do Programs 'Receive" Federal Assistance?
In Pennhurst, Justice Rehnquist also raised the possibility that the state
facility was not subject to any conditions in the federal grant statute, since
it did not receive any funds under the Act.9" This opens up an important
new defense for state and local litigants in a relatively unexplored area of
federal grant law: precisely what activities of a federal grantee should be
treated as receiving federal assistance?
This inquiry is of great importance. For example, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."96 Analogous provisions are found in section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973,9' and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972." In the case of a large entity such as a city or university, the ques-
tion of what activities are federally assisted may become difficult.
94. Eg., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285-86 (1971).
95. 101 S.Ct. at 1545.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (handicap-based discrimination in feder-
ally-assisted programs).
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) (sex-based discrimination in federally-assisted edu-
cation programs). In other instances, individual grant statutes contain their own nondis-
crimination provisions. Eg., § 109 of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1976).
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An important case in this area is Board of Public Instruction v. Finch,"
involving HEW's authority to terminate funds under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Title VI states that termination "shall be limited to the
particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom [a
finding of noncompliance] has been made. . . ."'I The court read the
latter restriction as prohibiting HEW from condemning programs "by as-
sociation."' 1 The court emphasized the need for the agency to proceed on
a program-by-program basis rather than terminating all education funds
once any discrimination is found in a school district receiving federal
funds.'
0 2
Recently, in Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board,0 3 a Michigan district
court utilized a similar analysis in holding that HEW's authority under
Title IX" did not extend to school athletic programs unless those pro-
grams received federal funds. The court rejected the federal government's
argument that it was enough that the school board received assistance.,0 5
The case may be of significance beyond the area of Title IX. Although
that statute also contains a "particular program, or part thereof' limitation
on the federal termination authority, the court viewed as the "key" inquiry
the sweep of the general prohibition on sex-based discrimination in feder-
ally-assisted education programs.1 6
Nondiscrimination provisions do not always contain the specific limita-
tions of Titles VI and IX. However, Justice Rehnquist's statements may
encourage courts to focus more clearly on whether a particular program or
activity does receive federal funds, as the court did in Othen.
The law in this area is still in a state of development. In Meyerson v.
Arizona,1°7 the plaintiff, who alleged handicap-based discrimination in vi-
olation of section 504, was a professor of psychology at the defendant uni-
versity. He argued that the entire university should be regarded as a
federally-funded activity or program.'0 On the other hand, the defendant
argued that the only question was whether the psychology department
could be so classified."' The Arizona district court rejected both argu-
99. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
101. 414 F.2d at 1077-79.
102. Id
103. 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
104. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
105. 507 F. Supp. at 1381.
106. Id at 1383.
107. 507 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz.1981).
108. Id. at 862,
109. Id.
19821
Catholic University Law Review
ments, stating that it could not yet determine whether "the nexus require-
ment of section 504" had been met."' As the law on this issue develops, it
is important that the state and local perspective be presented with force
and understanding.
IV. CONCLUSION
The lower courts are sometimes slow in discerning subtle changes in
Supreme Court doctrine."' There are encouraging signs that the lower
federal courts will resist plaintiffs' attempts to urge the broadest possible
reading of Thiboutot. "2 Vigorous advocacy at the state and local level as
well as awareness of the potential of Pennhurst and National Sea Clam-
mers will be crucial in this respect, as well as in advancing new defenses to
grant litigation generally.
110. Id
11l. A good example is the area of implied rights of action. Many courts continue to
apply, somewhat mechanically, the "four factor test" of Cort P. Ash, even though the
Supreme Court has restricted it almost to the point of abandonment.
112. Eg., Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 864 (D. Ariz. 1981). See supra notes
107-10 and accompanying text.
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